| Bibliografie zum unendlichen Regress der
epistemischen Rechtfertigung Epistemic Justification: Infinite Regress. Bibliography |
Aikin, Scott F.: "Don't Fear the Regress: Epistemic
Infinitism and Cognitive Value", 10. November 2007.  Online
verfügbar |
| Aikin, Scott F.: "Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism". Synthese 163, 2008. S. 175-185. |
| Albert, Hans: Traktat über kritische Vernunft. Tübingen. 1991. 5. Aufl. |
| Alston, William P.: Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989 |
| Alston, William P.: "Two types of Foundationalism"
Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976). S. 165-85. Reprint in: Alston, William P.: Epistemic Justification. S. 19-38 |
| Aristoteles: Lehre vom Beweis oder zweite Analytik. Übs. Eugen Rolfes. Philosophische Bibliothek 11. Hamburg: Meiner, 1976. Nachdr. d. Ausg. von 1922 [Organon]. 71a-73a |
| Armstrong, David M. (1973): Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge UP. S.150-61. |
| Atkinson, David, Jeanne Peijnenburg: "Justification
by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities". Online verfügbar |
| Audi, Robert: "Contemporary Foundationalism", in: Louis Pojman, Hg.: The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993. S. 206-213 |
| Audi, Robert: The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge UP, 1993 |
| Aune, Bruce: "Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable
Foundation?", in: Bruce A. Aune: Knowledge, Mind, and Nature: An
Introduction to Theory of Knowledge and the Philosophy of Mind. New York:
Random House, 1967 Online verfügbar |
| Aune, Bruce: "Remarks on Argument by Chisholm". Philosophical Studies 23 (1972). S. 327-334. |
| Bergmann, Michael: "What's NOT Wrong with
Foundationalism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68.1 (2004).
S. 161-165 Online verfügbar |
| Black, Oliver: "Induction and Experience: an Alleged Infinite Regress", in: Simon, G.; Vienne, J., Hg.: Mythes et Realités de l’Activé Scientifique. Lille: Université de Lille III, 1985. Reprint in: Fundamenta Scientiae 7, 3/4 (1987). S. 391-405 |
| Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regress Arguments and Infinite Regresses", in: Acta Analytica 16/17 (1996). S. 95-124 |
| Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regresses, Infinite Beliefs", unveröffentlicht, Internationales Wittgenstein-Symposium, 2003, Kirchberg, Wechsel |
| Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regresses of Justification", in: International Philosophical Quarterly 28.4 (1988). 422-437. |
| Black, Oliver: "Justification and Context" in: Paul Weingartner, Hg.: Logik, Wissenschaftstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1987. Internationales Wittgenstein-Symposium 11, 1986, Kirchberg, Wechsel. |
| Black, Oliver: "Legal Validity and the Infinite Regress", in: Law and Philosophy, 1996 |
| BonJour, Laurence: The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985 |
| Chisholm, Roderick: Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966 |
| Clark, Romane: "Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments". Philosophical Perspectives, 2. (1988). S. 369-380. |
| Cleve, James Van: "Semantic Supervenience and Referential Indeterminacy", Journal of Philosophy, 89.7 (1992). S. 344-361 |
| Cling, Andrew D.: "The Trouble with Infinitism". Synthese 138 (2004). S. 101-123. |
| Cornman, James W.: "Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification", in: American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977). S. 290-291 |
| Cornman, James W.: Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. With a Bibliographic Essay by Walter N. Gregory. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980. Philosphical Studies Series in Philosophy 18 |
| Cortens, Andrew: "Foundationalism and the Regress Argument". Disputatio12 (2002). S. 12-37 |
Dancy, Jonathan: Introduction to Contemporary
Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 Rezension |
| Dancy, Jonathan, Ernest Sosa, Hg.: Companion to Epistemology. New York: Blackwell, 1992 |
| Davidson, Donald: "Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" in: Lepore: Truth and Interpretation. S. 307-319 |
| Dretske, Fred: "Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational Belief vs. Reliable Belief", in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1991). S. 15-30 |
| Fantl, J.: "Modest infinitism". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, (2003). S. 537-562. |
| Fetzer, James H., Hg.: Principles of philosophical reasoning. Totowa, N.J. 1984 |
| Flores, Tito Alencar: "The Problem of the Criterion, Knowing That One Knows and Infinitism". Veritas 50:4, (2005). S. 109-128. |
| Foley, Richard: "Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress", American Philosophical Quarterly, 15.4 (1978). S. 311-316 |
| Foley, Richard: "Skepticism and Rationality," in Roth: Doubting. S. 69-81 |
| Foley, Richard: The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987 |
| Foley, Richard: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. New York: Oxford UP, 1993 |
| Fumerton, Richard: "Metaepistemology and Skepticism", in: Roth: Doubting. S. 57-68 |
| Gardner, Martin: "The Infinite Regress in Philosophy, Literature, and Mathematical Proofs". Scientific American 212.4 (1965), S. 128-32. |
| Gillett, Carl: "Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66.3 (2003). S. 709-717 |
| Goldman, Alvin: "What is justified belief?" in: Lucy: On Knowing and the Known |
| Gratton, Claude: "Circular Definitions, Circular Explanations, and Infinite Regresses". Argumentation 8.3 (1994). S. 295-308. |
| Bei Amazon nachschauen | |
|
 Claude Gratton: Infinite Regress Arguments. Springer
Netherlands, 2009. Gebunden, 211 Seiten |
| Grundmann, Thomas: Der Wahrheit auf der Spur.
Eine Verteidigung des erkenntnistheoretischen Externalismus. Paderborn:
Mentis, 2003.
Rezension |
| Harker, Jay E.: "Can There be an Infinite Regress of Justifed Beliefs?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62.3 (1984), S. 255-264. |
| Hetherington, Stephen (2010): "Elusive epistemological justification". Synthese 174, S. 315-330. |
| Jaeger, Robert A.: "Implication and Evidence". Journal of Philosophy 72.15 (1975). S. 475-485. |
| Johnston, Henry W., Jr.: "Question-Begging and Infinite Regress". Argumentation 8.3 (1994). S. 291-293. |
| Johnston, Henry W., Jr.: "The Rejection of Infinite Postponement as a Philosophical Argument". The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10.2 (1996). S. 92-104. |
| Kajamies, Timo: "A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism". Philosophia 37 (2009), S. 525-534. |
| Kelly, Kevin T. "How to Do Things With an Infinite
Regress". (2001): 11 Seiten;
Online verfügbar. |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism". Veritas 50:4, (2005). S. 153-172. |
| Klein, Peter D.: Certainty. A Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981 |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), S. 919-925 (comments on Richard Fumerton: Metaepistemology and Skepticism) |
| Klein, Peter D.: "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism", in: Luper, Steven, Hg.: The Skeptics. Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. S. 75-94. Starke Übereinstimmung mit "The Infinite Regress of Reasons and the Extent of Our Knowledge". |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Human Knowledge and the Infinite
Regress of Reasons", in: Tomberlin: Philosophical Perspectives 13. S.
297-325. Online verfügbar |
| Klein, Peter D.: "The Infinite Regress of Reasons
and the Extent of Our Knowledge". Online verfügbar; anscheinend Entwurf zu "How a
Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism". |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem". In M. Steup & S. Ernest, Hg:: Contemporary debates in epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005. |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism's take on justification, knowledge, certainty, and skepticism". Veritas 50 (2005), S. 153-172. |
| Klein, Peter D.: "Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails". Philosophical Topics 23.1 (1995). S. 213-236. |
| Klein, Peter D.: "What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68.1 (2004). S. 166-171 |
| Klein, Peter D.: "When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66,3 (2003). S. 718-729 |
| Klein, Peter D., Ted Warfield: "What Price Coherence?", Analysis, 54.3 (1994). S. 129-132 |
| Kvanvig, Jonathan L. "Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument". In: John Turri, Peter Klein, Hg.: Infinitism, geplant für 2010. |
| Lehrer, Keith: Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon,
1974. S. 15-18 —— Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990
Rezension |
| Leite, Adam: "A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83.3 (2005). S. 395-421. |
| Lepore, Ernest, Hg.: Truth and Interpretation. New York: Blackwell, 1986 |
| Lewis, David: "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", in: Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979). S. 339-359 |
| Lucy, Kenneth G., Hg.: On Knowing and the Known. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1996 |
| Luper-Foy, Steven: "Arbitrary Reasons", in: Roth: Doubting. S. 39-55 |
| Moser, Paul K.: "A Defense of Epistemic
Intuitionism", Metaphilosophy 15.3 (1984). S. 196-209 —— Empirical Justification. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985. Besonders Chap. IV: S. 107-140.
Rezension—— "Empirical Knowledge", in: Moser, Paul K. Hg.: Empirical Knowledge. Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. S. 3-19 —— Empirical Knowledge. Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Totowa, NJ 1986 —— Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge, Mass. 1989 —— "Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification", in: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23.1 (1985). S. 65-74 |
| Nathan, N. M. L.: "What Vitiates An Infinite Regress of Justification?" Analysis 37 (1977) S. 116-126 |
| Nolan, Daniel: "What's Wrong With Infinite Regresses?" Metaphilosophy 32.5 (2001) S. 523-38. |
| Oakley, I. T.: "An Argument for Skepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs", American Philosophical Quarterly 13.3 (1976). S. 221-228 |
| Oppy Graham: Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. |
| Peijnenburg, Jeanne (2007): "Infinitism Regained". Mind 116:463, S. 597-602. |
| Peijnenburg, Jeanne, David Atkinson (2008): "Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem". Studia Logica 89, S. 333-341. |
| Peirce, Charles, Sanders: "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in: Charles Hartshorne; Paul Weiss, Hg.: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Volume V. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965. S. 135-155 |
| Podlaskowski, Adam C., Joshua A. Smith (2010): "Infinitism and epistemic normativity". Synthese to be printed. |
| Pojman, Louis P.: What can we know? An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Belmont, Kalif.: Wadsworth, 1995. |
| Pollock, John: Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974. |
| Post, John F.: The Faces of Existence. An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987 |
| Post, John F.: "Infinite Regress Argument", in Dancy: Companion to Epistemology. S. 209-212 |
| Post, John F.: "Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation", in: Philosophical Studies 38 (1980). S. 31-52. |
| Pryor, John: "The skeptic and the dogmatist". Nous, 34 (2005), 517-549. |
| Pryor, John: "What's wrong with Moore's argument?". Philosophical Issue, Epistemology, 14 (2004), S. 349-378. |
| Roth, Michael David; Glenn Ross, Hg.: Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. Philosophical studies series 48 |
| Sadowsky, James A. 1980: "Can There Be an Endless
Regress of Causes?" International Philosophical Quarterly 20.4.
Nachdruck in Brian Davies, Hg. 2000: Philosophy of Religion. Oxford:
Oxford UP. S. 239-41.
Online verfügbar |
| Sanford, David: "Infinite Regress Arguments", in: Fetzer 1984, S. 93-117. |
| Sanford, David: "Infinity and Vagueness". The Philosophical Review 84.4 (1975), S. 520-535 |
| Sextus Empiricus: Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Malte Hossenfelder, Übs. Frankfurt am Main 1968 |
| Simson, Rosalind S.: "An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47:2 (1986), S. 179-208. |
| Smith, Holly: "Deciding how to decide: Is there a regress problem?" In: Bacharach, Michael, Susan Hurley, Hg.: Foundations of Decision Theory. Issues and Advances. Oxford. Oxford UO, 1991. S. 194-219 |
| Sosa, Ernest: Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980 |
| Sosa, Ernest: "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence
Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge", in: French, Peter A., Hg.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5: Studies in Epistemology.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1980. S. 3-25 Reprint in: Sosa, Ernest: Knowledge in Perspective und in: Sosa, Ernest; Jaegwon Kim, Hg.: Epistemology: An Anthology. |
| Sosa, Ernest; Jaegwon Kim, Hg.: Epistemology: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 |
| Tomberlin, James E., Hg.: Philosophical Perspectives 13. Epistemology, 1999. A Supplement to Noûs. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1999 |
| Turri, John: "On the regress argument for infinitism". Synthese. Synthese 166 (2009). S. 157-163 |
| Williams, John: "Justified Belief and the Infinite Regress Argument", in: American Philosophical Quarterly 18.1 (1981). S. 85-88 |
| Williams, Michael: Unnatural Doubts. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991 |
| Zagzebski, Linda: Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996 |
| Zalabardo, José L. (2006): "Bonjour, Externalism and the Regress Problem". Synthese 148, S. 135-169. |
| Zalabardo, José (2008): "Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:1, S. 34-58. |
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