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unendlicher Regress
Bibliografie zum unendlichen Regress der epistemischen Rechtfertigung
Epistemic Justification: Infinite Regress. Bibliography
Aikin, Scott: „Who's afraid of epistemology's regress problem?“ Philosophical Studies 126:2, 2005. S. 191-217
Aikin, Scott F.: "Don't Fear the Regress: Epistemic Infinitism and Cognitive Value", 10. November 2007. AikinOnline verfügbar
Aikin, Scott F.: "Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism". Synthese 163, 2008. S. 175-185.
Aikin, Scott (2009): "Don't Fear the Regress: Cognitive Values and Epistemic Infinitism". Think Autumn, S. 55-61.
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aikin AikinAikin, Scott: Epistemology and the Regress Problem. Abingdon, Routledge 2011. 207 Seiten – BeckerReviewed by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico
Albert, Hans: Traktat über kritische Vernunft. Tübingen. 1991. 5. Aufl.
Alston, William P.: Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989
Alston, William P.: "Two types of Foundationalism" Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976). S. 165-85.
Reprint in: Alston, William P.: Epistemic Justification. S. 19-38
Aristoteles: Lehre vom Beweis oder zweite Analytik. Übs. Eugen Rolfes. Philosophische Bibliothek 11. Hamburg: Meiner, 1976. Nachdr. d. Ausg. von 1922 [Organon]. 71a-73a
Armstrong, David M. (1973): Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge UP. S.150-61.
Atkinson, David, Jeanne Peijnenburg: "Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities".
atkinsonOnline verfügbar
Audi, Robert: "Contemporary Foundationalism", in: Louis Pojman, Hg.: The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1993. S. 206-213
Audi, Robert: The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge UP, 1993
Aune, Bruce: "Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation?", in: Bruce A. Aune: Knowledge, Mind, and Nature: An Introduction to Theory of Knowledge and the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Random House, 1967 auneOnline verfügbar
Aune, Bruce: "Remarks on Argument by Chisholm". Philosophical Studies 23 (1972). S. 327-334.
Bergmann, Michael: "What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68.1 (2004). S. 161-165 auneOnline verfügbar
Black, Oliver: "Induction and Experience: an Alleged Infinite Regress", in: Simon, G.; Vienne, J., Hg.: Mythes et Realités de l’Activé Scientifique. Lille: Université de Lille III, 1985. Reprint in: Fundamenta Scientiae 7, 3/4 (1987). S. 391-405
Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regress Arguments and Infinite Regresses", in: Acta Analytica 16/17 (1996). S. 95-124
Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regresses, Infinite Beliefs", unveröffentlicht, Internationales Wittgenstein-Symposium, 2003, Kirchberg, Wechsel
Black, Oliver: "Infinite Regresses of Justification", in: International Philosophical Quarterly 28.4 (1988). 422-437.
Black, Oliver: "Justification and Context" in: Paul Weingartner, Hg.: Logik, Wissenschaftstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1987. Internationales Wittgenstein-Symposium 11, 1986, Kirchberg, Wechsel.
Black, Oliver: "Legal Validity and the Infinite Regress", in: Law and Philosophy, 1996
BonJour, Laurence: The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985
Chisholm, Roderick: Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966
Clark, Romane: "Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments". Philosophical Perspectives, 2. (1988). S. 369-380.
Cleve, James Van: "Semantic Supervenience and Referential Indeterminacy", Journal of Philosophy, 89.7 (1992). S. 344-361
Cling, Andrew D.: "The Trouble with Infinitism". Synthese 138 (2004). S. 101-123.
Cornman, James W.: "Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification", in: American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977). S. 290-291
Cornman, James W.: Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. With a Bibliographic Essay by Walter N. Gregory. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980. Philosphical Studies Series in Philosophy 18
Cortens, Andrew: "Foundationalism and the Regress Argument". Disputatio12 (2002). S. 12-37
Dancy, Jonathan: Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985
dancy Rezension
Dancy, Jonathan, Ernest Sosa, Hg.: Companion to Epistemology. New York: Blackwell, 1992
Davidson, Donald: "Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" in: Lepore: Truth and Interpretation. S. 307-319
Dretske, Fred: "Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational Belief vs. Reliable Belief", in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1991). S. 15-30
Fantl, J.: "Modest infinitism". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, (2003). S. 537-562.
Fetzer, James H., Hg.: Principles of philosophical reasoning. Totowa, N.J. 1984
Flores, Tito Alencar: "The Problem of the Criterion, Knowing That One Knows and Infinitism". Veritas 50:4, (2005). S. 109-128.
Foley, Richard: "Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress", American Philosophical Quarterly, 15.4 (1978). S. 311-316
Foley, Richard: "Skepticism and Rationality," in Roth: Doubting. S. 69-81
Foley, Richard: The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987
Foley, Richard: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. New York: Oxford UP, 1993
Fumerton, Richard: "Metaepistemology and Skepticism", in: Roth: Doubting. S. 57-68
Gardner, Martin: "The Infinite Regress in Philosophy, Literature, and Mathematical Proofs". Scientific American 212.4 (1965), S. 128-32.
Gillett, Carl: "Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66.3 (2003). S. 709-717
Goldman, Alvin: "What is justified belief?" in: Lucy: On Knowing and the Known
Gratton, Claude: "Circular Definitions, Circular Explanations, and Infinite Regresses". Argumentation 8.3 (1994). S. 295-308.
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Gratton RegressClaude Gratton: Infinite Regress Arguments. Springer Netherlands, 2009. Gebunden, 211 Seiten
Grundmann, Thomas: Der Wahrheit auf der Spur. Eine Verteidigung des erkenntnistheoretischen Externalismus. Paderborn: Mentis, 2003. grundmann Rezension
Harker, Jay E.: "Can There be an Infinite Regress of Justifed Beliefs?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62.3 (1984), S. 255-264.
Hetherington, Stephen (2010): "Elusive epistemological justification". Synthese 174, S. 315-330.
Jaeger, Robert A.: "Implication and Evidence". Journal of Philosophy 72.15 (1975). S. 475-485.
Johnston, Henry W., Jr.: "Question-Begging and Infinite Regress". Argumentation 8.3 (1994). S. 291-293.
Johnston, Henry W., Jr.: "The Rejection of Infinite Postponement as a Philosophical Argument". The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10.2 (1996). S. 92-104.
Kajamies, Timo: "A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism". Philosophia 37 (2009), S. 525-534.
Kelly, Kevin T. "How to Do Things With an Infinite Regress". (2001): 11 Seiten; kellyOnline verfügbar.
Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism". Veritas 50:4, (2005). S. 153-172.
Klein, Peter D.: Certainty. A Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981
Klein, Peter D.: "Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), S. 919-925 (comments on Richard Fumerton: Metaepistemology and Skepticism)
Klein, Peter D.: "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism", in: Luper, Steven, Hg.: The Skeptics. Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. S. 75-94. Starke Übereinstimmung mit "The Infinite Regress of Reasons and the Extent of Our Knowledge".
Klein, Peter D.: "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons", in: Tomberlin: Philosophical Perspectives 13. S. 297-325. kleinOnline verfügbar
Klein, Peter D.: "The Infinite Regress of Reasons and the Extent of Our Knowledge". kleinOnline verfügbar; anscheinend Entwurf zu "How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism".
Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem". In M. Steup & S. Ernest, Hg:: Contemporary debates in epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005.
Klein, Peter D.: "Infinitism's take on justification, knowledge, certainty, and skepticism". Veritas 50 (2005), S. 153-172.
Klein, Peter D.: "Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails". Philosophical Topics 23.1 (1995). S. 213-236.
Klein, Peter D.: "What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68.1 (2004). S. 166-171
Klein, Peter D.: "When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66,3 (2003). S. 718-729
Klein, Peter D., Ted Warfield: "What Price Coherence?", Analysis, 54.3 (1994). S. 129-132
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. "Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument". In: John Turri, Peter Klein, Hg.: Infinitism, geplant für 2010.
Lehrer, Keith: Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974. S. 15-18
—— Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990 lehrer Rezension
Leite, Adam: "A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83.3 (2005). S. 395-421.
Lepore, Ernest, Hg.: Truth and Interpretation. New York: Blackwell, 1986
Lewis, David: "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", in: Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979). S. 339-359
Lucy, Kenneth G., Hg.: On Knowing and the Known. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1996
Luper-Foy, Steven: "Arbitrary Reasons", in: Roth: Doubting. S. 39-55
Moser, Paul K.: "A Defense of Epistemic Intuitionism", Metaphilosophy 15.3 (1984). S. 196-209
—— Empirical Justification. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985. Besonders Chap. IV: S. 107-140. moser Rezension
—— "Empirical Knowledge", in: Moser, Paul K. Hg.: Empirical Knowledge. Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. S. 3-19
—— Empirical Knowledge. Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Totowa, NJ 1986
—— Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge, Mass. 1989
—— "Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification", in: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23.1 (1985). S. 65-74
Nathan, N. M. L.: "What Vitiates An Infinite Regress of Justification?" Analysis 37 (1977) S. 116-126
Nolan, Daniel: "What's Wrong With Infinite Regresses?" Metaphilosophy 32.5 (2001) S. 523-38.
Oakley, I. T.: "An Argument for Skepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs", American Philosophical Quarterly 13.3 (1976). S. 221-228
Oppy Graham: Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.
Peijnenburg, Jeanne (2007): "Infinitism Regained". Mind 116:463, S. 597-602.
Peijnenburg, Jeanne, David Atkinson (2008): "Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem". Studia Logica 89, S. 333-341.
Peirce, Charles, Sanders: "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in: Charles Hartshorne; Paul Weiss, Hg.: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Volume V. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965. S. 135-155
Podlaskowski, Adam C., Joshua A. Smith (2010): "Infinitism and epistemic normativity". Synthese to be printed.
Pojman, Louis P.: What can we know? An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Belmont, Kalif.: Wadsworth, 1995.
Pollock, John: Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974.
Post, John F.: The Faces of Existence. An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987
Post, John F.: "Infinite Regress Argument", in Dancy: Companion to Epistemology. S. 209-212
Post, John F.: "Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation", in: Philosophical Studies 38 (1980). S. 31-52.
Pryor, John: "The skeptic and the dogmatist". Nous, 34 (2005), 517-549.
Pryor, John: "What's wrong with Moore's argument?". Philosophical Issue, Epistemology, 14 (2004), S. 349-378.
Roche, William A. (2012): „A reply to Cling’s ‘‘The epistemic regress problem’’”. Philosophical Studies 159:2, S. 263-276.
Roth, Michael David; Glenn Ross, Hg.: Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990. Philosophical studies series 48
Sadowsky, James A. 1980: "Can There Be an Endless Regress of Causes?" International Philosophical Quarterly 20.4. Nachdruck in Brian Davies, Hg. 2000: Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford UP. S. 239-41. sadowskyOnline verfügbar
Sanford, David: "Infinite Regress Arguments", in: Fetzer 1984, S. 93-117.
Sanford, David: "Infinity and Vagueness". The Philosophical Review 84.4 (1975), S. 520-535
Sextus Empiricus: Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis. Malte Hossenfelder, Übs. Frankfurt am Main 1968
Simson, Rosalind S.: "An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47:2 (1986), S. 179-208.
Smith, Holly: "Deciding how to decide: Is there a regress problem?" In: Bacharach, Michael, Susan Hurley, Hg.: Foundations of Decision Theory. Issues and Advances. Oxford. Oxford UO, 1991. S. 194-219
Sosa, Ernest: Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980
Sosa, Ernest: "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge", in: French, Peter A., Hg. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5: Studies in Epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1980. S. 3-25
Reprint in: Sosa, Ernest: Knowledge in Perspective und in: Sosa, Ernest; Jaegwon Kim, Hg.: Epistemology: An Anthology.
Sosa, Ernest; Jaegwon Kim, Hg.: Epistemology: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000
Tomberlin, James E., Hg. (1999): Philosophical Perspectives 13. Epistemology, 1999. A Supplement to Noûs. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Turri, John (2009): "On the regress argument for infinitism". Synthese. Synthese 166. S. 157-163
Turri, John (to be printed): “Infinitism, finitude and normativity”. Philosophical Studies, 5 Seiten
Wieland, Jan Willem (2011): "On Gratton's Infinite Regress Arguments – Claude Gratton: Infinite Regress Arguments. In Argumentation Library (Vol. 17). Springer, Dordrecht, 2010". Argumentation 25, S. 107-113.
Williams, John (1981): "Justified Belief and the Infinite Regress Argument", in: American Philosophical Quarterly 18.1. S. 85-88
Williams, Michael: Unnatural Doubts. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991
Wright, Stephen (2013): „Does Klein’s infinitism offer a response to Agrippa’s trilemma?”. Synthese 190, S. 1113-1130.
Zagzebski, Linda: Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996
Zalabardo, José L. (2006): "Bonjour, Externalism and the Regress Problem". Synthese 148, S. 135-169.
Zalabardo, José (2008): "Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:1, S. 34-58.
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