| Zitate angelsächsischer Philosophen
des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts Chris Anderson Alex Byrne Donald Davidson John Dewey Nelson Goodman David R. Hilbert Keith Lehrer David Lewis Erich H. Loewy Steven Luper-Foy Robert Nozick Duncan Pritchard Michael Scriven Hans D. Sluga Elliott Sober Barry Stroud Timothy Williamson |
| Chris Anderson US Philosoph, arbeitet für The Sapling Foundation; |
| "Why use a negative to define
something that is profoundly positive?", Anderson zum Begriff "Atheist",
in John Brockman, Hg.: Die neuen Humanisten, S. 417.
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| Alex Byrne MIT, Cambridge MA, |
| "The sceptic doesn't need
an argument, she needs treatment", S. 301 "Barbers, painters and builders' merchants need not bother themselves with the sorites paradox, but what else are philosophers supposed to do?", S. 303 "How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?". Noûs 38 (2004): S. 299-325; |
| Donald Davidson * 6.3. 1917 Springfield (Mass.). Nicht verwechseln mit Donald Grady Davidson (8.8.1893, Campbellsville, Tenn., U.S. 25.4. 1968, Nashville, Tenn.), US-amerikanischer Schriftsteller, Essayist und Lehrer. |
| "...
nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another
belief." "A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge", in: Sven Bernecker, Fred Dretske, Hg. Knowledge. Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. S. 416 Vergleiche dazu |
| "Empiricism, like other
isms, we can define pretty much as we please, ..." "Meaning, Truth and Evidence" in Barrett, Gibson. Perspectives on Quine, 1993 |
| John Dewey 20.10. 1859 Burlington (Vermont) 1.6. 1952 New York; amerikanischer Philosoph, Pädagoge und Psychologe |
| "Die Suche nach Gewißheit hat unsere grundlegende Metaphysik bestimmt" (S. 26). |
| "Der Gedanke, daß die Werte, die in der Welt, in der wir leben, unstabil und schwankend sind, in einem höheren Reich (das die Vernunft beweist, das wir aber nicht erfahren können) ewig sicher sind, daß all die Güter, die hier zugrunde gehen, dort triumphieren, kann den Gedrückten Trost geben. Aber es verändert die wirkliche Situation nicht im geringsten." (S. 39). |
| "Ein wissenschaftlicher Geist würde nichts mehr bedauern als eine Situation, in der es keine Probleme mehr gäbe" (S. 104). "... viele Denker werden vielleicht glauben, daß jede Lösung eine wirklichen Verlust bedeutet" (S. 108). |
| "Man nehme die Ideen und was aus ihnen folgt weg, und der Mensch scheint nicht besser als die Tiere auf dem Felde" (S. 111). |
| "Da alle Wert-Eigenschaften in den Gegenständen fehlen, welche die Wissenschaft uns präsentiert, nimmt man an, daß die Realität keine solche Eigenschaften habe" (S. 139). |
| "Wissenschaftliche Begriffe sind nicht die Enthüllung einer schon bestehenden und unabhängigen Realität. Sie sind ein System von Hypothesen, das unter Bedingungen genauer Überprüfung ausgearbeitet worden ist und mit dessen Hilfe unser intellektueller und praktische Verkehr mit der Natur freier, sicherer und bedeutsamer wird." (S. 167) |
| "Die Natur kann verstanden werden. Aber diese Möglichkeit wird nicht von einem Geist realisiert, der über sie von außen nachdenkt, sondern durch Operationen, die innerhalb ihrer durchgeführt werden." (S. 216). |
| "Werte
werden dadurch konstituiert, daß man an etwas Gefallen findet und es
genießt." (S. 257, Kapitel "Die Konstruktion des Guten") |
| "Erkennen besteht aus Operationen, die den Gegenstände der Erfahrung eine Form geben" (S. 295) |
| Obige Zitate aus
Die Suche nach Gewißheit [The Quest for Certainty]. Frankfurt am
Main 2001. |
| Nelson Goodman 7. August 1906 Sommerville, Massachusetts November 25, 1998 Needham, Massachusetts. Professor of Philosophy u. a. an der University of Pennsylvania und Harvard, Mass. |
| "Perhaps the day will come when
philosophy can be discussed in terms of investigation rather than controversy,
and philosophers, like scientists, be known by the topics they study rather
than by the views they hold." The Structure of
Appearance, 2nd ed. 1966, S. xviii |
| David R. Hilbert * 1959; Department of Philosophy University of Illinois at Chicago |
| It is an undeniable fact
that the way the world appears to us is the joint product of the way the world
is and the way we are. In: Color and Color Perception. A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. Stanford: CSLI, 1987. S. 13 Any view that denies that any external things are colored flies in the face of the way we conceive and talk about colors. In: Color and Color Perception. A Study in Anthropocentric Realism. Stanford: CSLI, 1987. S. 82 |
| Keith Lehrer *1936; Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona |
| "There is no exit from the circle of ones
beliefs." Knowledge. Oxford, 1974. S. 188 In Anlehnung an W.V. Quines, There is no ... cosmic exile. |
| "... the finest monuments of
scientific achievements mark the refutation of claims of
impossibility." Theory of Knowledge, 1990, S. 6 "The human mind provides us with no prophylactic against error, even concerning our own thoughts and sensations, as the strange beliefs of humanity, arising from hopes and fears, abundantly illustrate. There is nothing so foolish that we cannot believe it if it is repeated often enough and with enough authority. Every demagogue understands this very well." Theory of Knowledge, 1990, S. 55; Hervorhebung: H.H. |
| David Lewis |
| "Maybe ascription of knowledge
are subtly context-dependent, and maybe epistemology is a context that makes
them go false. Then epistemology would be an investigation that destroys its
own subject matter. If so, the sceptical argument might be flawless, when we
engage in epistemologyand only then!" In: "Elusive
Knowledge", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74
(1996). |
| Erich H. Loewy * 1927 Wien, 1938 Flucht in die USA, University of California Davis School of Medicine |
| "Jede wahre Demokratie
müßte, falls sie sich entwicklen und weiterhin als Demokratie gelten
will, Gedankenaustausch und Diskussion als Vorbedingung demokratischer
Entscheidungen fördern." "Ethik und die Bausteine einer wahren Demokratie: Diskussionskultur", Aufklärung und Kritik, 1/2004, S. 64-74 |
| Steven Luper-Foy, Steven Luper |
| "Skeptics are bad company for the same reason as are those who
live a long life advocating suicide on the grounds that nothing is worth
doing." Mit "skeptics" sind diejenigen Skeptiker gemeint, die bestreiten, daß Wissen insgesamt oder in bestimmten Gebieten überhaupt möglich ist. Quelle: "Arbitrary Reasons", S. 39, in: Michael Roth, Glenn Ross, Hg. Doubting. Contemporary Perspectives on Sketicism. Dordrecht 1990, S. 39-55. |
| Robert Nozick 16. November 1938 New York 23. Januar 2002 |
| The word philosophy means
the love of wisdom, but what philosophers really love is reasoning (S.
xi). Similarly, the belief that certain conduct is divinely prescribed and that all deviations will meet dire punishment might be a useful belief for people to have, whether or not it is true or makes any sense at all, provided it guarantees to others a person's continuing conduct (S. 11). If understanding is something we now value in part for its own sake?whyever we originally began to value this?and if rationality enters into the nature of such understanding as a constituent, then rationality too may be valued in part, for its own sake (S. 137) Many of philosophy's traditional intractable problems, resistant to rational resolution, may result from attempts to extend rationality beyond this delimited function. These include the problems of induction, of other minds, of the external world, and of justifying goalsthe Kantian attempt to make principled behavior the sole ultimate standard of conduct is another extension of rationality beyond its bound (S. 176) Alle obigen Zitate aus: The Nature of Rationality |
| Duncan Henry Pritchard
* 30.1.1974; Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling |
| "... one of the morals that can
be gleaned from the study of the history of philosophy is that the emergence of
a consensus is often the result of a shared mistake rather than a common
understanding." Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. S. 1 |
| Michael Scriven Evaluation Center, Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, MI |
| "Now even belief in something
for which there is no evidence, i.e., a belief which goes beyond the evidence,
although a lesser sin than belief in something which is contrary to
well-established laws, is plainly irrational in that it simply amounts to
attaching belief where it is not justified. So the proper alternative, when
there is no evidence, is not mere suspension of belief, e.g., about Santa
Claus; it is disbelief. It most certainly is not faith." Primary Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, S. 103 |
| Hans D. Sluga |
| "Gottlob Frege can be
considered the first analytic philosopher." Gottlob Frege. London 1980 |
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| Elliott Sober University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 USA |
| "... we cannot reject the
use of a distinctionin science, in philosophy, or in ordinary
lifejust on the ground that it is vague." "Epistemology for Empiricists", S. 48. In: Peter A. French, Hg.: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18:1, S. 3961 |
| "The principle of parsimony
counsels that we should hypothesise that an entity does not exist, if
its postulation is to no explanatory point. Agnostic formulations of the
methodological maxim belie the way in which the razor is employed toatheistic
effects. The razor counsels removal and replacement. A claim of existence is
exised from a theory, only to be replaced with its own negation." S.
145-146 Sober, Elliott: "The Principle of Parsimony". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32. Jg. (1981), S. 145-156. |
| Barry Stroud University of California, Berkeley |
| "And how could Davidson, or
anyone, deny that seeing that it is rainign can give one good reason to believe
that it is rainigne? Looking and seeing what is going on is the best way to get
a reasonable belief about the weather." "Sense-Experience and the Grounding of Thought", in: Nicholas Smith, Hg.: Reading McDowell. On Mind and World. S. 82. Vergleiche dazu |
| Timothy Williamson Research Interests: Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology |
| "It takes less to summon up an
evil demon than to exorcize him" "Knowledge, Context, and the Agent's Point of View", S.97, in: Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter: Contextualism in Philosophy. Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford 2005. S. 91-114 Online SF-Story: |