| William K. Clifford 4.5. 1845 Exeter 3.3. 1879 London |
| "To sum up: it
is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence. If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call into question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing itthe life of that man is one long sin against mankind." "The Ethics of Belief" Contemporary Review, 1877. Nachdruck in Leslie Stephen, Frederick Pollock, Hg.: William K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays (1879, 1886). Und in The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1999. |
| Peter Thomas Geach * 29. März 1916 in London; britischer Philosoph und Logiker |
| "One needs no excuse for being a
preacher of rationality; there are too few such preachers, not too many." Reason and Argument. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. S. xi |
| Gilbert Harman * 1938 US-Amerikanischer Philosoph, Princeton University |
| "People differ from other animals in having
language", S. vii "We are justified in continuing to believe something unless we have a special reason to change our minds. The hypotheses the sceptic discusses are not equally reasonable, since only one of them is already believed", S. 22 "The best explanation of its seeming to you that certain things occurred in the past is that they did occur and you remember them", S. 189 Thought. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973. |
| "Fine distinctions made in
ordinary judgments become blurred when these judgments are made in a
philosophical context", S. 164 "Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation". American Philosophical Quarterly 5:3, 1968 S. 164-173. |
| John Hawthorne |
| If
you put a gun to my head Ill go with that theory.
APA Pacific conference 2003;
|
| Jaakko Hintikka * 12. Januar 1929 in Vantaa, Finnland |
| "The facts that the so-called
laws of logic are not »laws of thought« in the sense of natural
laws seems to be generally admitted nowadays." Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. London: King's College, 2005. [1962, Cornell University], S. 30 |
| Drew V. McDermott * 1949, Professor of Computer Science at Yale University |
| Traditional logics suffer
from the »monotonicity problem«: new axioms never invalidate old
theorems. McDermott, Drew (1982): "Nonmonotonic Logic II:
Nonmonotonic Modal Theories". Journal of the Association for Computing
Machinery 29:1, S. 33-57, S. 33. |
| Louis P. Pojman 22. April 1935 - 15. Oktober 2005 |
| "I love epistemology. Its problems and puzzles keep me awake at night, entertaining me, and sometimes wearing me down." S. xi |
| Edo Pivcevic |
| ... nothing can be
rationally believed that cannot be rationally explained (S. 2)
Science is the business of inventing models in terms of which the observed phenomena can most efficiently be explained, but no such model excludes the possibility of alternative explanations (S. 8) To say that things 'necessarily' happen as they do because they are part of the original design is to beg the question of why they should have been included in the original design in the first place (S. 274) Aus: The Reason Why. A Theory of Philosophical Explanation, |
| Alvin Plantinga * 15. November 1932 Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, US-amerikanischer Philosoph |
| Dawkins and Daniel Dennett
[...] are the touchdown twins of current academic atheism. Auf You might say that some of his [Dawkins'] forays into philosophy are at best sophomoric, but that would be unfair to sophomores. |
| John Skorupski * 19 September 1946 |
| "Against
an absolute sceptic nothing can or needs to be said." Vorwort zu Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy. 1998 [1912]. S. ix. |
| Friedrich Waismann 21. 3. 1896 Wien 4. 11. 1959 Oxford, GB; Mathematiker, Physiker, Philosoph |
| "... in philosophy there are no
proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided,
Yes or No." S. 1 "No philosophic argument ends with a Q.E.D. However forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in philosophy, neither with the stick of logic nor with the stick of language." S. 29 Alle Zitate aus: How I See Philosophy. London 1968. |