| Charlie Dunbar Broad * 30. Dezember 1887 in Harlesden, Middlesex; 11. März 1971, britischer Philosoph. |
| Lastly, did Bacon provide
any logical justification for the principles and methods which he elicited and
which scientists assume and use? He did not, and he never saw that it was
necessary to do so. There is a skeleton in the cupboard of Inductive Logic,
which Bacon never suspected and Hume first exposed to view. Kant conducted the
most elaborate funeral in history, and called Heaven and Earth and the Noumena
under the Earth to witness that the skeleton was finally disposed of. But, when
the dust of the funeral procession had subsided and the last strains of the
Transcendental Organ had died away, the coffin was found to be empty and the
skeleton in its old place. Mill discretely closed the door of the cupboard, and
with infinite tact turned the conversation into more cheerful channels. Mr
Johnson and Mr Keynes may fairly be said to have reduced the skeleton to the
dimensions of a mere skull. But that obstinate caput mortuum still awaits the
undertaker who will give it Christian burial. May we venture to hope that when
Bacon's next centenary is celebrated the great work which he set going will be
completed; and that Inductive Reasoning, which has long been the glory of
Science, will have ceased to be the scandal of Philosophy? Broads Abschluss eines Vortrags am 5. Oktober 1926 in Cambridge zum The Bacon Tercentenary (dreihundertster Todestag von Francis Bacon, 9. April 1626) C. D. Broad: The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1926. Reprinted in Ethics and The History of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1952. |
| William K. Clifford 4.5. 1845 Exeter 3.3. 1879 London |
| "To sum up: it
is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence. If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call into question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing itthe life of that man is one long sin against mankind." "The Ethics of Belief" Contemporary Review, 1877. Nachdruck in Leslie Stephen, Frederick Pollock, Hg.: William K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays (1879, 1886). Und in The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1999. |
| Peter Thomas Geach * 29. März 1916 in London; britischer Philosoph und Logiker |
| "One needs no excuse for being a
preacher of rationality; there are too few such preachers, not too many." Reason and Argument. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. S. xi |
| Gilbert Harman * 1938 US-Amerikanischer Philosoph, Princeton University |
| "People differ from other animals in having
language", S. vii "We are justified in continuing to believe something unless we have a special reason to change our minds. The hypotheses the sceptic discusses are not equally reasonable, since only one of them is already believed", S. 22 "The best explanation of its seeming to you that certain things occurred in the past is that they did occur and you remember them", S. 189 Thought. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973. |
| "Fine distinctions made in
ordinary judgments become blurred when these judgments are made in a
philosophical context", S. 164 "Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation". American Philosophical Quarterly 5:3, 1968 S. 164-173. |
| John Hawthorne |
| If
you put a gun to my head Ill go with that theory.
APA Pacific conference 2003;
|
| Jaakko Hintikka * 12. Januar 1929 in Vantaa, Finnland |
| "The facts that the so-called
laws of logic are not »laws of thought« in the sense of natural
laws seems to be generally admitted nowadays." Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. London: King's College, 2005. [1962, Cornell University], S. 30 |
| David A. Johnson * 1952, Associate Professor of Philosophy an der Yeshiva University, New York |
| It is remarkable how many
famous arguments can be refuted essentially just by stating them carefully. How
rarely this is done. S. x. I once bought a ticket in a rather large New York State lottery, because I wanted to know what it felt like to be irrational., S. 134 David Johnson: Truth Without Paradox, |
| John George Kemeny (Ungarisch: Kemény János György) 31 Mai 1926 26. Dezember 1992 |
| The problem of induction
is one of the most hotly debated issues of modern philosophy. It is certainly
the central issue in any philosophy of science. (S. 711) Kemeny, John G. (1963): "Carnap's Theory of Probability and Induction". In: P.A. Schilpp, Hg.: The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, IL: Open Court, S. 711-738. |
| Drew V. McDermott * 1949, Professor of Computer Science at Yale University |
| Traditional logics suffer
from the »monotonicity problem«: new axioms never invalidate old
theorems. McDermott, Drew (1982): "Nonmonotonic Logic II:
Nonmonotonic Modal Theories". Journal of the Association for Computing
Machinery 29:1, S. 33-57, S. 33. |
| Louis P. Pojman 22. April 1935 - 15. Oktober 2005 |
| "I love epistemology. Its problems and puzzles keep me awake at night, entertaining me, and sometimes wearing me down." S. xi |
| Edo Pivcevic |
| ... nothing can be
rationally believed that cannot be rationally explained (S. 2)
Science is the business of inventing models in terms of which the observed phenomena can most efficiently be explained, but no such model excludes the possibility of alternative explanations (S. 8) To say that things 'necessarily' happen as they do because they are part of the original design is to beg the question of why they should have been included in the original design in the first place (S. 274) Aus: The Reason Why. A Theory of Philosophical Explanation, |
| Alvin Plantinga * 15. November 1932 Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, US-amerikanischer Philosoph |
| Dawkins and Daniel Dennett
[...] are the touchdown twins of current academic atheism. Auf You might say that some of his [Dawkins'] forays into philosophy are at best sophomoric, but that would be unfair to sophomores. |
| John Skorupski * 19 September 1946 |
| "Against
an absolute sceptic nothing can or needs to be said." Vorwort zu Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy. 1998 [1912]. S. ix. |
| Friedrich Waismann 21. 3. 1896 Wien 4. 11. 1959 Oxford, GB; Mathematiker, Physiker, Philosoph |
| "... in philosophy there are no
proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided,
Yes or No." S. 1 "No philosophic argument ends with a Q.E.D. However forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in philosophy, neither with the stick of logic nor with the stick of language." S. 29 Alle Zitate aus: How I See Philosophy. London 1968. |